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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
 No. 10-4517 
___________ 
 
MANUEL RIOS, 
           Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
_______________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 D.C. Civil Action No. 2-09-cv-05004 
 (Honorable Michael M. Baylson) 
______________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 September 13, 2011 
 
 Before:  SLOVITER, SCIRICA and SMITH, Circuit Judges. 
 
 (Filed: September 14, 2011) 
_________________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Manuel Rios appeals the District Court’s Order affirming the Commissioner of the 
Social Security Administration’s decision to deny Supplemental Security Income.  We 
will affirm. 
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I. 
 Manuel Rios contends he suffers from depression, anxiety, and a shoulder injury.  
He was born on June 1, 1957,  has a ninth-grade education, and past work experience as a 
truck driver. 
 Rios filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) on May 1, 2007, alleging disability starting May 1, 2005.  The 
applications were denied.  Subsequently, the Social Security Administration granted Rios 
a hearing before an administrative law judge who concluded that Rios was not disabled 
within the meaning of the Social Security Act and accordingly denied his applications.  
Rios requested review of the decision.  The Appeals Council denied the request, and the 
ALJ’s decision became final.  The District Court affirmed the ALJ’s order that Rios was 
not entitled to disability or SSI benefits. 
II.
1
 
 We will affirm a Commissioner’s final denial of SSI benefits if it is supported by 
substantial evidence.
 2
  We are not “empowered to weigh the evidence or substitute [our] 
conclusions for those of the fact-finder.”  Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d 
Cir. 1992).  If the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence they 
                                                 
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and we exercise appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
2
 Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion.”  Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted).  Evidence is not substantial if the 
Commissioner failed to consider all relevant evidence or failed to explain the resolution 
of conflicting evidence.  See Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 121 
(3d Cir. 2000). 
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“shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  We have the “responsibility to scrutinize the 
entire record and to reverse or remand if the [Commissioner’s] decision is not supported” 
accordingly.  Morales, 225 F.3d at 317 (quoting Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 970 (3d 
Cir. 1981)). 
 To be eligible for disability benefits, a claimant has the burden to demonstrate that 
he is “unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or 
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve 
months.”  42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).  In addition, the claimant’s physical or mental 
impairments must be “of such a severity that he is not only unable to do his previous 
work, but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any 
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Id. at § 
1382c(a)(3)(B). 
 The Commissioner must follow a five-step sequential evaluation to determine 
whether a claimant is disabled.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.  He must decide:  1) whether the 
claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; 2) whether the claimant has a 
severe impairment; 3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a listed 
impairment; 4) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from performing past 
relevant work; and 5) whether the claimant can perform any other work which exists in 
the national economy, in light of the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and 
residual functional capacity.  Id. at § 404.1520(a)(4).  The evaluation will continue 
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through each step unless it can be determined at any point that the claimant is or is not 
disabled.  Id.  
 The ALJ performed each of the five steps of the required analysis.  She considered 
Rios’s physical and psychological examinations, medical treatment, and testimony in 
addition to testimony from a vocational expert.  In particular, the ALJ relied on the 
consultative psychological examiner’s diagnosis of Rios’s Global Assessment 
Functioning (GAF) as between 50 and 55.
 3
  The ALJ concluded that, though Rios’s 
depression was a severe impairment, it did not meet or equal the severity of affective 
disorders found in the Social Security Regulation’s “Listing of Impairments.”4  20 C.F.R. 
§ 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Listing 12.04.  Further, the ALJ found Rios retained the 
residual functional capacity for all exertional work levels, limited by his ability to 
perform only simple, routine tasks with occasional changes in work settings, and 
                                                 
3
 GAF scores are used by “mental health clinicians and doctors to rate the social, 
occupational, and psychological functioning of adults.”  Irizarry v. Barnhart, 233 Fed. 
Appx. 189, 190 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007).  The GAF scale ranges from 1 to 100, with a score of 
1 being the lowest and 100 being the highest.  See Debaise v. Astrue, No. 09-0591, 2010 
WL 597488, at *5 n.7 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2010).  A GAF score of 41-50 indicates an 
individual has serious symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, 
frequent shoplifting) or any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school 
functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep a job).  See Watson v. Astrue, No. 08-1858, 
2009 WL 678717, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2009) (internal quotations omitted).  A GAF 
score of 51-60 indicates moderate symptoms or moderate difficulty in social, 
occupational, or school functioning.  See Debiase, 2010 WL 597488, at *5 n.7 (internal 
quotations omitted).  
4
 At the third step of the five-step analysis, the ALJ must consider the medical severity of 
a claimant’s impairment.  If the claimant has an impairment whose severity meets or 
equals the severity of one of the impairments found in the Social Security Regulation’s 
“Listing of Impairments,” the claimant is disabled.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). 
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moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace.  Consequently the ALJ 
determined Rios was not disabled based on steps 3 and 5 of the five-step analysis. 
 Rios contends the ALJ’s judgment is not supported by substantial evidence 
because she failed to discuss two GAF scores given by his treating psychiatrists.  In 2007 
and 2008 Rios’s doctors determined he had a GAF of 50, suggesting that he suffered 
from severe symptoms or impairments in social, occupational, or school functioning.  
The ALJ only addressed the consultative examiner’s 2007 GAF score of 50-55 within her 
opinion, noting that Rios’s condition ranged from moderate to severe.  
 Rios contends that the two GAF scores of 50, coupled with his treatment records, 
establish disability.  GAF scores do not have a “direct correlation to the severity 
requirements” of the Social Security mental disorder listings.  65 Fed. Reg. 50746-01, 
50764-65 (2000).  They are only medical evidence that informs the Commissioner’s 
judgment of whether an individual is disabled.  See Watson, 2009 WL 678717, at *5.  To 
meet the requisite level of severity for an affective disorder, Rios would have to show 
either 1) “[m]edically documented persistence” of particular symptoms resulting in 
specific degrees of difficulty of daily functioning, or 2) a “medically documented history 
of a chronic affective disorder of at least 2 years’ duration that has caused more than a 
minimal limitation of ability to do basic work activities” in addition to specific symptoms 
or signs of decompensation.  20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Listing 12.04.  
Neither Rios’s prior GAF scores nor his other medical records indicate the marked 
limitations or periods of deterioration necessary for such a finding.  Instead they show 
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Rios was consistently sad and depressed, but displayed moderate progress towards 
reaching his treatment goals. 
 We agree with the District Court that the ALJ’s omission of the psychiatrists’ 
GAF scores does not warrant remand.  The ALJ was not “cherry-picking” or ignoring 
medical assessments that ran counter to her finding.  Dougherty v. Barnhart, No. 05-
5383, 2006 WL 2433792, at *10 n.4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2006) (citing Colon v. Barnhart, 
424 F. Supp. 2d 805, 813-814 (E.D. Pa. 2006)); Watson, 2009 WL 678717, at *7.  Indeed 
she used a score that not only reflects Rios’s therapist’s and doctors’ notes that his 
symptoms ranged from moderate to severe, but that also aligns with her overall judgment 
that his residual functional capacity was limited by his impairment.  Thus the ALJ’s 
failure to reference the two GAF scores was not an error, and her finding that Rios is not 
disabled is supported by substantial evidence. 
III. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
